nuclear problems in Japan (which seems to worsen are ) are rekindling the nuclear debate in Europe and Spain. I, of course, I have no ability to get into the most technical and safety (here's a interesting interview with a nuclear expert, as always somewhat biased towards the technology, but with much more information on the case that many; and it seems that the country will organize an open session with experts on these issues). But I would like to reflect on issues probability of risk and our perception of them.
Basically, my argument is this: what is happening in Japan should not make us change our attitude towards nuclear. Why? Because what happened was something that could happen, and we knew that. When you look at nuclear, calculates the probability of an accident (in fact, more advanced analysis on these issues, probabilistic risk analysis, I'll probably be in the nuclear field). And the probability of an accident exists and is nonzero. What happens is that it is very small: 1e-6, 1e-9, according to various estimates I quote from memory (but will not be far from reality). The accident Japan, does that we have to ask whether this risk is poorly calculated? Since the absence of further analysis, I do not. What is the probability of a tsunami following an earthquake for which no resistance has been designed nuclear plant? Is it more than the 1e-6? I do not think, really ...
So the only thing that has happened here is that it has complied with the probability of an accident, all nuclear power plants worldwide, and all the years they have been in operation ever had to pass something, like say the probability of accident was not void. When countries have decided to build nuclear, accept this risk (hoping that they never play, of course). It's like when you drive a car: there is a chance of dying in an accident, possibly that of a nuclear accident. But we all drive, because we accept the risk. Or put another way, because the benefits of driving us more than compensate for the risk of dying. And this is how I understand you have to understand the nuclear built. The trouble is that, when touched, we regret the decision. But does that mean that the decision was bad? Not necessarily, no decision is optimal ex-ante ex-post, when uncertainty is resolved. Of course, when you get the china, the thing is more evident. But again, if a decision was considered good before the resolution of uncertainty will remain after future and, if the probability does not change.
So why now everyone walks reviewing its nuclear programs? Because this accident makes our perception of risk increased (possibly by Availability bias). Is this rational? Not necessarily the truth ... Too many cognitive problems through: before we refused to recognize the risk involved , and now we magnify.
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